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Introduction
At the international climate meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009, President Obama pledged that, by 2020, the United States would achieve reductions in greenhouse gas th Congress (2009 Congress ( -2010 , the pledge would not be met. This paper presents a forecast for US emissions in 2020. Substantial uncertainty remains because important regulations are still pending. Nonetheless, our central estimate indicates that the United States is near to reaching this goal; currently the country is on course to achieve reductions of 16.3 percent from 2005 levels in 2020.
Three factors contribute to this emissions projection. First is regulation under the Clean Air Act. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has already finalized fuel efficiency standards for mobile sources and rules for preconstruction permitting under the Act. The most important regulation from EPA will be the expected operating performance standards for new and existing stationary sources, and the design and stringency of these standards is the most important source of uncertainty in our estimate. A second factor is the secular trends in fuel prices and energy efficiency. The advantageous change in relative fuel prices has led to a substantial shift toward the use of natural gas and away from coal for electricity generation.
Meanwhile, a discernible reduction in the energy intensity of economic activity is stemming from the expanded role of energy efficiency. The economic recession has also had an overall influence on reducing current emissions, but this will have less of an influence by 2020. The  Dallas Burtraw is the Darius Gaskins senior fellow and Matt Woerman is a research associate at Resources for the Future. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support provided by Mistra's Instrument Design for Global Climate Mitigation (INDIGO) project and the FORMAS project-Human Cooperation to Manage Natural Resources. 1 The president's pledge did not specify whether the reductions would apply to the entire economy or only a set of covered sectors within the economy. We assume that the reductions would apply only to emissions produced by the sectors covered by the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill (H.R. 2454). These covered sectors-including electric generators, fossil-fueled transportation, and industrial sources, as well as other large emitters-composed approximately 84.5 percent of US greenhouse gas emissions in 2005. All references to 2005 emissions levels count only emissions from these covered sectors.
third factor is the effect of subnational efforts to reduce emissions, including cap and trade in California and 9 northeastern states, renewable portfolio standards for electricity generation in 29
states, and energy efficiency resource standards in 24 states.
The United States is about on track to achieve President Obama's Copenhagen pledge with respect to mitigation goals. Perhaps even more surprisingly, emissions in the domestic US economy under the current status quo, which we label the Clean Air Act regime, will probably be less in 2020 than would have occurred if the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade proposal (H.R. Although the United States is close to meeting its pledge regarding domestic emissions, one must be less optimistic about the ability of the country to fulfill its pledge for international financing. The United States joined other developed countries in committing to support emissions mitigation and adaptation in developing countries through financing that would grow to $100 billion per year from public and private sources by 2020. However, the United States has not put a plan in place to achieve its share of this commitment (Purvis 2012) . The public contribution to the financing goals in future years appears to be insufficient. The contribution of private capital, including payments for international offsets, was expected to fulfill the lion's share of the US financing commitment but international offsets play no role in meeting regulations under the Clean Air Act (Richardson 2012) . Private investment capital in energy resource development already substantially exceeds the $100 billion target, but this cannot be seen as an additional source of funding, as implied by the Copenhagen Accord. At this point, the United States is expected to fail to meet its financing commitments for 2020.
Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act
The modern Clean Air Act, passed in 1970, conveys broad authority to EPA to develop regulations to mitigate harm from air pollution. In 2007, the Supreme Court confirmed that this authority applies to the regulation of GHGs. 2 Subsequently, the agency made a formal, sciencebased determination that GHGs are dangerous to human health and the environment, which compels the agency to develop regulations to mitigate the harm. Those regulations will take shape in three ways (Figure 1 ). 
Permitting for Stationary Sources
In January 2011, EPA also adopted regulations for preconstruction permitting for major new and modified sources, such as power plants and industrial facilities. Permitting requires sitespecific, technology-based review of control technology. Permitting is implemented at the state level, though the technological inquiry is national in scope and subject to EPA oversight. Under current EPA guidelines, this permitting process applies to about 900 construction projects per year at sources that emit large quantities of GHGs.
Performance Standards for Stationary Sources
The third regulatory action still anticipated by EPA will be the implementation of operating performance standards affecting new and, in particular, existing stationary facilities. 4 The first proposed standards, issued in April 2012 for new fossil-steam power plants, require these plants to achieve a carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions rate of 1,000 pounds per megawatthour; this is based on the performance of a new natural gas combined-cycle plant. A new coalfired plant would be required to install carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) to achieve this emissions rate. However, the standard includes a provision that allows a coal plant to operate for up to 10 years without CCS if it then installs CCS so that it achieves a 30-year average emissions rate that meets the standard of 1,000 pounds per megawatt-hour. Similar new source performance standards for other source categories-including refineries, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and other emitting sources-are expected to roll out over time.
Once EPA has finalized its standards for new sources in a particular source category, the Clean Air Act requires that the agency begin to develop standards for existing sources in that category. Existing stationary facilities are the source of the largest share of GHG emissions and provide the greatest opportunity for cost-effective reductions in emissions, according to economywide modeling (EIA 2009a). Existing steam boilers at power plants fueled with coal, oil, and natural gas, along with petroleum refineries, account for more than one-third of GHG emissions in the United States. Conceivably, EPA could issue standards that mandate large-scale substitution away from coal to natural gas or nonemitting technologies. However, indications are that EPA will not issue standards that require a major substitution away from coal. Instead, the agency is looking initially at improving the operating efficiency of power plants and refineries while rewarding, but not requiring, the substitution from coal to natural gas.
In its preliminary notice of a proposed rulemaking, the agency indicated that operating efficiency at existing facilities might be improved by 2-5 percent, resulting in a comparable reduction in emissions without changing the electricity output from these facilities (EPA 2008).
A 5 percent reduction in emissions from existing coal-fired power plants would amount to over 90 million tons per year, or about 1.4 percent of total US emissions. The agency identified the possibility of additional emissions reductions of 2-5 percent if coal-fired facilities cofired with biomass. Larger emissions reductions may result if the regulations explicitly enable cofiring with or substitution to natural gas at existing coal-fired facilities as a way to achieve an emissions rate reduction on average.
Across all the stationary source categories identified in EPA's technical documents, emissions total 62 percent of domestic emissions . Existing studies identified by EPA identify opportunities to reduce emissions from these sectors by up to 10 percent, or 6.2 percent of total US emissions. These short-term measures, which include energy and process efficiency improvements, the beneficial use of process gases, and limited material and product changes, have been identified by various authors as -cost-effective,‖ meaning that they are zero-cost options for a firm after accounting for the cost of energy saved. These calculations apply engineering costs based on case studies, but have been validated in one econometric study of operating efficiency in the electricity sector (Linn et al. 2012 ).
Perhaps more important than the stringency of the regulations in the long run is how EPA chooses to structure regulations, because this will identify a pathway for ongoing regulatory activity. Figure 1 illustrates that a performance standard approach was chosen over other potential sources of authority under the Act. 5 The primary responsibility for implementation and enforcement resides with state governments, which will submit plans indicating how they will implement and achieve EPA's environmental goals. Many authors have encouraged EPA to issue a strong model rule that could be adopted by each state and that would implement a uniform, cost-effective national trading program. However, this raises a dilemma in the potential transfers of wealth across regions. EPA could choose to develop subcategories within a sector based on technology type or region of the country. Departure from a uniform national program would allow emissions rate averaging or trading, for example through regional programs, but the greater the degree of subcategorization, the higher total national costs are likely to be . An alternative to a process driven by EPA is one that embraces a variety of approaches proposed by the states, each calibrated to meet or exceed the EPA standard. The structure, timing, and stringency of this regulation are the major sources of uncertainty in US emissions profile.
Secular Trends in Natural Gas Supply and Energy Efficiency
Over the past three years, expectations about future prices of natural gas and future demand for electricity have evolved substantially, as reflected in adjustments to the energy forecasts produced by EIA in its Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2009b; EIA 2011) . Between 2009 and 2011, forecasts of future natural gas supply expanded multifold, and the expected level of future natural gas prices fell significantly. Coincidentally, forecasts of demand levels and growth are also lower because of the current economic downturn as well as expanded investments in energy efficiency that accumulate over time. To observe how these secular trends affect the electricity sector, we solve Resources for the Future's Haiku electricity market model two times, once calibrated to EIA's 2009 forecast and once calibrated to EIA's 2011 forecast. 6 The change in electricity demand due to these differing forecasts is illustrated in Figure 2 . Reduced demand for electricity leads to a reduction in the amount of electricity generated, yielding CO 2 emissions reductions. The increased supply of natural gas also reduces CO 2 emissions as coal-fired generation is replaced by natural gas is shown in Figure 3 . The combined effect of these secular trends in the electricity sector is expected to reduce CO 2 emissions in 2020 by 240 million tons . 
Subnational Policy
Many recent efforts at the state and regional level have sought to reduce emissions of GHGs, either directly, through a cap-and-trade policy, or indirectly, by mandating the increased use of renewables in generating electricity or the displacement of electricity demand with energy efficiency. Significant attention currently is focused on California, which will launch a cap-andtrade program affecting the electricity and industrial sectors in 2013; the program will expand to include the transportation sector, covering 85 percent of GHG emissions in 2015. This program is part of the implementation of California's 2006 law that requires the state to reduce its GHG emissions (including emissions associated with imported electricity) to 1990 levels by 2020.
Implementation of the law is expected to yield emissions reductions of 88 million tons per year from business as usual. Regulatory standards and measures are already in place to achieve 78 percent of this emissions target (Burtraw and Szambelan 2012) . For example, in 2011, emissions covered by the RGGI program were 44 million tons below the policy's cap. Nonetheless, the price floor in the program auction has returned nearly a billion dollars in revenue that has been directed in large part toward energy efficiency investments in the region (Hibbard et al. 2011 ).
Policies to reduce GHG emissions have also been enacted at the state level. In 29 states plus the District of Columbia, renewable portfolio standards mandate that a specified percentage of electricity must be generated by renewable sources. In 24 states, fully funded energy efficiency resource standards establish specific, long-term targets for energy savings that must be met through electricity or natural gas energy efficiency programs. Although these policies do not directly reduce GHG emissions, the increased use of renewable generators and the reduction in energy demand decreases the use of carbon-intensive fossil fuels. In most states, the percentage of electricity required to be renewable and the amount of demand displaced by energy efficiency will increase over the next decade, with many policies reaching the maximum stringency around the year 2020.
Adding Up the Pieces: Projected US Emissions in 2020
We have identified three factors that contribute to emissions reductions in the United
States. First, under the Clean Air Act, EPA has produced GHG regulations affecting mobile sources and preconstruction permitting. Regulations governing the operation of stationary sources are in development, although at a slow pace. Taken together, these initiatives are expected to achieve emissions reductions of 10.5 percent by 2020 compared to a 2005 baseline.
It is uncertain whether these reductions will be fully realized, but the legal and institutional dominoes are in place for this to occur.
Second, secular trends in the economy, including changing relative fuel prices and the expanded influence of energy efficiency, will lead to additional reductions in the electricity sector that we measure to be 3.3 percent, compared to 2005 levels. Figure 4 . In contrast, the anticipated emissions reductions under the Clean Air Act regime total 16.3 percent, exceeding those reductions within the United States that would have occurred under cap and trade. Table 1 displays the reductions achieved by these different policies, as well as the portion of reductions achieved by domestic reductions, domestic offsets, international offsets, and non-market offsets. 7 Below, we examine several sensitivity cases with different assumptions about reductions under a national cap, which are also included in Table 1 .
It is especially noteworthy that the comparison ignores the contribution of emissions reductions, both domestically and abroad, through the purchase of offsets. Global emissions may have been lower with the passage of Waxman-Markey, but surprisingly, in the sectors of the domestic economy covered by the emissions cap, they likely would have been more than will occur under the Clean Air Act regime. It is important to note that the 2005 levels, to which these reductions are compared, count only the emissions from the covered sectors and do not include the sectors in which the offsets would occur. Thus the comparison does not have sectoral equivalence, but that is precisely the intent of offsets, to allow for reductions outside of the covered sectors.
Fuel Economy Standards
In our central estimate of Waxman-Markey, we assume that the fuel economy standards Thus no adjustment is needed to account for allowances banked in 2020 in this case.
Conclusion
In sum, we estimate that the United States is on track to achieve emissions reductions of Second is the finalization of the new source performance standard for electric steam boilers, which is expected early next year, and EPA's posture in the development of existing source standards. The existing source standards may be more stringent than the technical documents have identified. That is because it is a state-driven process in which states develop implementation plans for EPA's approval. Many states view this as an opportunity to strengthen and broaden the regional trading programs. The uncertainty about the issuance of these standards is a concern, but the legal requirements of the Clean Air Act are clear. A new administration could -slow walk‖ the regulatory development and delay it for years, but is unlikely to stop it altogether.
Another possibility is the reversal of the Clean Air Act, or at least the removal of authority for enforcing the GHG rules. This seems far-fetched because it would require an unbalanced legislature and administration. However, a less extreme outcome could be for a new legislature and administration to defund the activities of EPA in developing these rules. This would delay the rules indefinitely.
If the eventualities play out as they currently are aligned, we find that not only is President Obama's pledge in Copenhagen within reach, but emissions reductions within the domestic economy could actually be greater than would have occurred under comprehensive climate policy with cap and trade, as proposed by Waxman-Markey. The reason is that a large portion of the emissions reductions that were expected under cap and trade would have been offsets, whereas many of the factors driving emissions reductions under the current Clean Air Act regime would have been effectively or explicitly preempted under cap and trade.
One might conjecture that advantageous changes in the economy that lead to emissions reductions under the Clean Air Act could have gone the other way, that is, they could have been disadvantageous changes that led to greater use of fossil fuel and greater GHG emissions. The inability of an emissions cap to capture emissions reductions from secular changes has the corollary that it prevents emissions increases resulting from economic growth or the greater use of fossil fuels. However, the course of history is not equally likely in this regard. Throughout developed economies the long-run trend is toward lower emissions intensity of economic activity. Since 1990 the GHG intensity of economic activity in the United States has fallen by 33 percent, along with the intensity of most other forms of pollution, even as overall economic activity and emissions have increased. Harrington et al. (2000) document that ex post assessments of the cost of regulations tend to be less than anticipated, especially for incentivebased policies like cap and trade, often due to mistakes in forecasting the baseline against which necessary emissions reductions would be measured. In other words, an emissions cap set in statute is more likely to end up less stringent than more stringent compared to what was initially anticipated. Incentive-based approaches would have a better environmental performance if they accommodate this fact by including rules to adjust their stringency in response to changing costs (Burtraw et al. 2010) . Regulatory approaches do so inherently.
In the short run, to the surprise of many, the United States appears able to meet its mitigation obligations under the Copenhagen agreement. In contrast, however, the United States seems off-course with respect to meeting its financing obligations under the agreement. Cap and trade provided a vehicle and incentive to direct private capital toward investment in developing countries through the purchase of emissions offsets. It also provided a source of funds for the federal government that could have supported the public fund contribution to the financing obligation. In contrast, under a regulatory approach, these avenues are not available. In particular, international offsets appear to be unavailable as a legal compliance instrument by which to meet GHG reduction standards under the Clean Air Act. The subnational cap-and-trade policies allow for international offsets, but their supply in those programs is limited. Private financing of energy development internationally is already extensive but generally could not be seen as an additional contribution to the outcome of US climate policy. In the absence of capand-trade policies in general, and an active offset market in particular, the United States is likely to have difficulty meeting its commitment to finance international investments.
